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FAMILY DRAMA:
DANGLING INHERITANCES AND PROMISED LANDS
Patricia A. Cain *
HENDRIK HARTOG, SOMEDAY ALL THIS WILL BE YOURS: A HISTORY OF
INHERITANCE AND OLD AGE (2012). Pp 368. Hardcover $31.00.
INTRODUCTION
Those of us who as law professors teach Wills, Trusts, and Estates are familiar
with the many different stories that arise when money and death create family conflicts.
Think King Lear.' Think another play, The Heiress (also a movie starring Olivia de
Havilland). 2 Families create very interesting and dramatic narratives whenever a proper-
tied patriarch or matriarch dies, survived by disappointed heirs and friends. In his book,
Someday All This will be Yours: A History of Inheritance and Old Age, 3 legal historian
Hendrik Hartog4 tells many of those stories, primarily from mid-nineteenth century to
mid-twentieth century New Jersey.' Because he has access to trial court records, the sto-
ries he is able to tell are much richer than those that have been edited in appellate report-
ers.
Hartog's focus is on stories of property owners, mostly middle class, who dangle
promises of inheritance before whatever person in a younger generation they can find to
tempt to remain on the premises and care for them in their old age.6 A related story line
involves property owners who promise nearby land to a child or other relative (and
sometimes not even a relative) if the promisee will settle down, build a home and raise
* Professor of Law, Santa Clara University; Aliber Family Chair in Law, Emerita, University of Iowa.
1. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TRAGEDY OF KING LEAR (telling the story of a wealthy man who gave
away his wealth too soon). Hartog refers to the problem of giving away property and power too soon as the
"King Lear problem." See HENDRIK HARTOG, SOMEDAY ALL THIS WILL BE YOURS: A HISTORY OF
INHERITANCE AND OLD AGE 33-34 (2012). He notes that older people using their property to influence their
children to care for them were all familiar with the King Lear problem and were regularly advised not to part
with their wealth too soon. See id. One character in the cases Hartog discusses used the phrase "keep the loaf
under one's [sic] own arm." Id. at 66 (citing Updike v. Ten Broeck, 32 N.J.L. 105, 115 (N.J. 1866)).
2. RUTH GOETZ & AUGUSTUS GOETZ, THE HEIRESS (1947) (a play in which a wealthy father worries
about the motives of a suitor who is courting his somewhat plain daughter; adapted from WILLIAM JAMES,
WASHINGTON SQUARE (1880)).
3. See generally HARTOG, supra note 1.
4. Class of 1921 Bicentennial Professor in the History of American Law and Liberty, Princeton
University.
5. HARTOG, supra note 1, at 7.
6. Id. at 8-9.
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his or her family on the nearby land.7 These promises are intended to keep the younger
generation close at hand as needed and to avoid potential loneliness that might set in
once the promisor is too old and frail to travel about in society.8
The older generation promisor, however, wanted to avoid the "King Lear prob-
lem." 9 That meant most of these promises were not fulfilled during lifetime. And, not
surprisingly, many were not fulfilled at death either. Things changed over time. Family
members had fallings out. The promisor remarried and decided to leave everything to the
new spouse. Creditors of the promisor pressed claims against the land before death. As a
result, the disappointed promisee ended up in court claiming an ownership interest in the
land at stake.
All of these cases have core common facts. Almost always, the promise is not in
writing."o That, of course, raises a Statute of Frauds problem." And, whereas part per-
formance can often overcome that problem, often the performance is the provision of
services by someone who either is a close family member or functions as a close family
member.12 In such cases, it was common for courts to presume that the services were
gratuitous. 13 This was especially true when the services were performed by women and
involved tasks such as cooking and cleaning. These services were the sorts of services
that a father would have expected from a daughter, or even a daughter-in-law, and such
daughters or daughters in-law should not have expected remuneration.1 4 Even when the
tasks involved nursing duties, the presumption was against remuneration. 15 During this
time period, nursing was not a recognized trade,16 and besides, this work is what family
members did for each other.
Some of these presumptions began to change once we moved into the twentieth
century. The first wave of feminism had strengthened the rights of women, and married
7. Id. at 142.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 55-57. See supra note 1, explaining the "King Lear problem."
10. Id. at 81.
11. Id. at 177. Agreements for the transfer of land generally must be in writing. The English Statute of
Frauds, entitled An Act for the Prevention of Frauds and Perjuries, was enacted in 1677, providing as follows
for contracts:
[N]o action shall be brought whereby to charge any executor or administrator upon any
special promise, to answer damages out of his own estate; ... upon any contract or sale of
lands, tenements or hereditaments, or any interest in or concerning them ... unless the
agreement upon which such action shall be brought, or some memorandum or note there-
of, shall be in writing, and signed by the party to be charged therewith, or some other per-
son thereunto by him lawfully authorized.
29 CHARLEs II ch.3, § 4.
Most American jurisdictions adopted statutes similar to the English Statute of Frauds. The Restatement of Con-
tracts states: "(1) The following classes of contracts are subject to a statute, commonly called the Statute of
Frauds, forbidding enforcement unless there is a written memorandum or an applicable exception . . . (d) a
contract for the sale of an interest in land (the land contract provision) . RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 110 (1981).
12. Id. at 177-78.
13. Id. at 209.
14. Id. at 214-17.
15. Id. at 263.
16. Id.
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women's property acts had given married women a claim to be paid for their services. 17
By the 1940s, many members of the middle-class became entitled to social security
payments in their old age, lessening their need to rely on promises of gifts of land after
death to secure the care they desired. " But, for the approximately one-hundred years of
litigation history that Hartog reviews, in New Jersey, family squabbles over broken
promises to transfer land to the promisee were heard in courtrooms around the state.
SAMPLE CASES
Hartog's retelling of the stories in each case is full of rich detail that it would be
otherwise impossible to glean from the recorded opinions in the cases. These stories help
us to imagine that world of the late 1800s and early 1900s. Here are a few brief summar-
ies of some of these cases, based on Hartog's rich retellings.
Ridgway v. English (1850)19
A daughter stayed with her father after she turned twenty-one. Her mother passed
away and her father asked her to stay and help him run the household and raise the
younger children. She stayed for four years, performing these requested duties. She then
married and moved into her own home. The father told the daughter of his intention to
pay her, and neighbors who witnessed this also supported her claim. She understood that
he would leave her something at his death, but he left her nothing. She sued in assump-
sit,20 requesting payment for her labor and also in quantum meruit.21 The court ruled
against the daughter, finding that she had only done what any dutiful daughter would
have done, and that essentially, all the father had done was make an oral promise to
make a future gift. Such promises are not enforceable in law or in equity. 22
Davison v. Davison (1861)23
A father promised his son that if he would join him on the farm, live there and
work on the farm, he would leave the farm to the son at his death. The son accepted the
promise and moved onto the farm. The son worked on the farm for fifteen years to the
full satisfaction of the father. He married and built a separate home for his family on the
farm. However, the father and son had a falling out over a number of incidents involving
the son's wife. She had accused the father of being a lecher and the father accused her of
17. Although in the early days of married women's property acts, this right to remuneration was often lim-
ited by court decisions that said married women only had a right to contract for services outside of the home.
See id.
18. See id. at 270.
19. Ridgway v. Ex'rs of English, 22 N.J.L. 409 (N.J. 1850). See generally HARTOG, supra note 1, at 98-99.
20. A cause of action in assumpsit is basically a claim for breach of contract. A plaintiff sues in assumpsit
when the defendant has failed to pay compensation that was promised. Assumpsit was a common law cause of
action that arose around 1500. See EDGAR BODENHEIMER, JOHN B. OAKLEY & JEAN C. LovE, AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM: READINGS AND CASES 40-41 (4th ed. 2004).
21. Quantum meruit translates roughly into "as much as he deserved." It is an action by which reasonable
compensation can be recovered if the services were performed under circumstances in which reasonable com-
pensation was to be expected. Id. at 41.
22. Ridgway, 22 N.J.L. at 423.
23. Davison v. Davison, 13 N.J. Eq. 246 (N.J. Ch. 1861). See generally HARTOG, supra note 1, at 37-53.
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adultery. Once the father's accusations became more public, the son filed a slander suit
against his father. The father then transferred title in the farm to his two other sons in ex-
change for their promises to care for him for life. The two sons sued their brother for
ejectment. Ultimately, the court of equity agreed with the son who had worked the land
for fifteen years. He had not been paid, except of course, he had rent-free lodging. In any
event, the court did not think this looked like a case of gratuitous services. The son ex-
pected compensation for his work. And he expected the land as compensation. The court
ordered specific performance, which meant that the son would be required to specifically
perform his side of the bargain-to continue providing services. At his father's death, he
would be paid by getting title to the farm. If the father refused the services of the son,
which surely seemed a possibility given the depth of their falling-out, then some adjust-
ment would have to be made, but the court hoped that the parties could work it out. This
is the first case in New Jersey to establish a clear right to specific performance on facts
such as these.
Horsfield v. Gedicks (1922)24
Frances moved in with her aunt and uncle after her mother died. She was nine
years old. The aunt and uncle, childless, raised Frances as their own child. When Frances
married, she and her husband continued to live with her aunt and uncle. Then the aunt
and uncle purchased property in New Jersey and moved there. They held title as tenants
by the entireties, which assured that the property would go to the surviving spouse.
Frances, her husband, and their children also moved and shared the New Jersey home
with the aunt and uncle. Three years later, now with three kids in tow, Frances and her
husband wanted to move into a home of their own. They began looking for an appropri-
ate rental. But the aunt and uncle did not want them to move away. The tract they owned
was large enough to accommodate another home, so they offered to give Frances the
corner of their lot if they would build a house and stay there. Frances and her husband
accepted the offer. The aunt provided much of the construction costs, but she and the un-
cle did not transfer title to the land to Frances and her husband. Then, the aunt died and
title vested one-hundred percent in the uncle. He again promised he would draw up a
deed and take care of Frances, but he did not. And one year later, now in his late fifties,
Frances's uncle married a twenty-seven year old woman. When they had their first child,
the uncle deeded the property to his new wife. She demanded rent from Frances, who
refused, claiming it was her property. But with no papers to prove anything, she was on
shaky ground. The uncle's new wife sued to evict the family based on nonpayment of
rent. Frances argued that the property was hers, and that it had been gifted to her, even
though no deed had been delivered. The court agreed, finding that the oral promise to
make the gift could be enforced in equity.
24. Horsfield v. Gedicks, 118 A. 275 (N.J. Ch. 1922). See generally HARTOG, supra note 1, at 109-120.
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Danenhauer v. Danenhauer (1930)25
Lee Danenhauer and his wife lived in Philadelphia, but he wanted to move to the
country and become a horticulturist. He found some suitable land in Pennsylvania and
visited it with his father, who lived in New Jersey. The father and mother convinced their
son, Lee, that he should not buy the land in Pennsylvania, but should instead ply his de-
sired trade on a place they owned near the Jersey Shore, which they used only as a sum-
mer house. They promised him that if he did move there and make the place his own, his
mother, who was in fact the owner of the property, would leave the property to him by
will. Lee and his wife accepted the offer, sold their Philadelphia home, and moved to
New Jersey. He raised irises and peonies on the property after investing much time and
capital in the venture. He improved the summer house so that it would be suitable for
year-round living for his family. During the summer, Lee's parents stayed with them at
the house. And Lee's brother, George, and his family visited as well. About six years in-
to this venture, Lee's mother died. Less than three weeks later Lee's father died as well.
The mother's will, as it turned out, left the summer home to her husband for life, then to
her two sons, Lee and George, for life, and then to George's children. The promise had
been breached. Lee sued for specific performance and won.
COMMENTARY
There are many more cases, but they tend to follow the same trend toward en-
forcement of oral promises to convey land when there was sufficient evidence of partial
performance-enough evidence to take the case out of the Statute of Frauds. Benefit to
the promisor or detriment to the promisee could both serve to provide the basis for partial
performance. The stories that lawyers put together on behalf of their clients who were
suing for performance of an agreement, based on rendition of services, tended to center
around two core ideas: (1) that, in the case of services performed, the services were so
extraordinary that the continued work by the promisee could not be understood but for
reliance on a promise to compensate, and (2) the services were not performed by a per-
son in the role of a close family member who might be expected to provide such services
gratuitously.
The last two cases discussed above do not really fall into the category of providing
services in exchange for future payment. 26 Instead, they involve detrimental reliance on a
promise and the investing of significant capital in the promised land. The Horsfield v.
Gedicks case is interesting because the court was willing to count the investment of the
aunt's capital in the construction of the home as siding with niece, Frances, since it was
clear that the aunt intended the investment to be a completed gift. 27
During this same period of time, there were numerous plaintiffs who lost their cas-
es. 28 Nonetheless, as someone who reads and teaches cases about promises to make a
25. Danenhauer v. Danenhauer, 148 A. 390 (N.J. Ch. 1930). See generally HARTOG, supra note 1, at 136-
40.
26. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
27. Horsfield v. Gedicks, 118 A. 275, 276 (N.J. Ch. 1922).
28. See e.g., Smith v. Smith, 28 N.J.L. 208, 219 (N.J. 1860) (finding that the Statute of Frauds prevented
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will in favor of someone, I was struck by how many cases ruled in favor of the claimant.
I suspect many of these cases would turn out differently today, certainly in states that
have adopted Section 2-514 of the Uniform Probate Code. 29 This provision contains its
own Statute of Frauds as applied to a contract to make a will in favor of another person
and it contains no exception for partial performance or reliance. 30
New Jersey adopted this Uniform Probate Code provision, effective as of May 1,
1982.3' But, before adoption of that statute, and at least as recently as 1969, New Jersey
courts were willing to enforce parol (oral) promises to change a will in favor of the
promisee in cases where the promisee agreed to take care of the promisor. 32
Emerging Themes
After thinking about the rather common practice of tempting children and others
with promises of inheritances that were the focus of the cases in this book, I noticed sev-
eral themes. First, as Hartog points out, this period of time had a particular way of deal-
ing with old age and infirmity.33 Modem practice for managing old age and illness has
changed tremendously as the older generations have resources other than children, in-
formally adopted children, or the kindness of neighbors and employees. Today those of
us approaching the twilight of our days can rely on social security, private retirement
plans, Medicare, and Medicaid if we become penurious. In addition, commercial entities,
some purely charitable, have arisen that specialize in providing care to the elderly. We
now have assisted living options and nursing homes. Parents are often left alone in their
homes, or move to smaller condominiums or apartments once the children have left the
nest, which ultimately most children do. Thus, most of the themes that arise from the
one-hundred year's worth of cases that are the center of this book tell us very little about
the future. Rather, they tell us something about a social history of a past era.
specific performance of the promise to convey, but that the promisee may be entitled to claim the value of the
improvements he made on the property since that claim, although based on an oral promise, did not involve the
land). In addition, services provided by women were often discounted as valid consideration for promises be-
cause they were not really extraordinary; see e.g., Disbrow v. Durand, 24 A. 545, 545 (N.J. Ch. 1892) (sister
lived with older brother and cared for him for twenty years, but claim against estate for remuneration was dis-
missed as unviable on the basis that she had voluntarily stayed there and participated in the household as any
family member would have done without remuneration); Updike v. Titus, 13 N.J. Eq. 151, 153, (N.J. Ch. 1860)
(holding that a mother could not recover for services rendered to her son, but the son could recover money he
gave his mother as a loan).
29. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-514 (1990). This section provides:
A contract to make a will or devise, or not to revoke a will or devise, or to die intestate, if
executed after the effective date of this [article], may be established only by (i) provisions
of a will stating material provisions of the contract, (ii) an express reference in a will to a
contract and extrinsic evidence proving the terms of the contract, or (iii) a writing signed
by the decedent evidencing the contract. The execution of a joint will or mutual wills
does not create a presumption of a contract not to revoke the will or wills.
30. Id.
31. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:1-4 (West 2013).
32. See, e.g., Klockner v. Green, 254 A.2d 782, 785-86 (N.J. 1969) (stepdaughter and stepson, the children
of testator's deceased husband, agreed to take care of testator after she promised she would execute a new will
in their favor; testator had the will drawn up in favor of the stepchildren, but being suspicious about signing a
will and the inevitability of death, she never executed it; court held that stepchildren deserved specific perfor-
mance despite the fact that they testified that they would have provided the services gratuitously).
33. See HARTOG, supra note 1, at 32-33.
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Past Social History Themes
I was struck by a consistency among most of the cases whereby the parent of the
promisee was unwilling to part with property now, in order to pay the person who had
agreed to take care of the parent. This is the "King Lear problem" that Hartog addresses
throughout the book.34 But, the problem is more complex when you focus on the needs
of the caregiver. Why would anyone provide caregiving services, sometimes for decades,
without any assurance that the promise would be carried out, and without any current
compensation? Of course for some, there was current compensation in the form of free
room and board. But, any reasonable person would realize that that free lodging would
disappear at the death of the property owner unless the promise was fulfilled. The "King
Lear problem" then, becomes one of how to give enough-or appear to give enough-
without giving away too much too soon.
The answer in the cases seems to be this: promise again and again.35 Repeating the
promise makes it more real and it also makes it more susceptible of proof if made in
front of neighbors and other witnesses. I was surprised that in many of the cases, lawyers
had advised the promisor not to worry about carrying out the promise before death be-
cause there was enough evidence for the promisee to have the claim settled after death.
This advice tells us something about the culture of this time. It seemed to be a breach of
manners to insist on settling such accounts before death. The better course was to main-
tain the fiction that services were performed out of love and affection and not in ex-
change for inherited bounty. The social norm appears to have been one that would en-
force such promises after death no matter what the promisor did or did not do about his
or her last will and testament. As a result, one can assume that there were many more
cases of these promises, sometimes informally called "retirement contracts," 36 where the
administrators of the deceased promisor's estate fulfilled the promise. Only in cases of
greed, or serious family disharmony, or indeed lack of good evidence that there really
was a promise in the first place would litigation ensue.
Another surprising thing about these cases is the tension that enforcement of the
promise after death creates with the principle of freedom of testation, which Hartog men-
tions. 37 However, he stresses that freedom of testation needed to be protected in part to
support the testator's ability to obtain care late in life. 38 The ability of the testator to
change his or her mind was sufficient to keep the caregiver in line, to assure the testator
of continued services. 39 That makes some sense. The risk of a falling out, however, one
that would result in being disinherited, would seem to create doubt in a reasonable care-
giver's mind as to whether continued service was really a good idea. The number of de-
cisions finding in favor of the claimant suggest a nuanced understanding of freedom of
testation. The testator should have just enough freedom to change his or her mind, but if
34. Id. at 33-34.
35. See generally id.
36. See Hendrik Hartog, Someday All This Will Be Yours: Inheritance, Adoption, and Obligation in Capi-
talist America, 79 IND. L.J. 345, 360 n.102 (2003) (discussing retirement contracts).
37. HARTOG, supra note 1, at 15-16.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 16.
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the testator stepped over the line drawn in equity for what was fair and expected, that
freedom could be curtailed. This nuance would suggest that the claimant should more
readily win in cases where the promisor died intestate, simply failing to carry out the
promise, which could occur for many reasons and not just because the promisor had
changed his or her mind. On the other hand, when the promisor specifically repudiated
the deal by changing the will and disinheriting the promisee, especially on grounds that
the promise was not being fulfilled on the other end, I should think the claimant's possi-
bility of success would be significantly reduced.40 However, I can find no evidence in
Hartog's discussion of the cases that this was the case.
Finally, another interesting fact that came out in many of these cases was how of-
ten the promisor changed his or her will,4' or, in some cases, had a deed drawn up that
was never delivered.4 2 One gets the impression that the middle class (and, of course
some of these cases involve more propertied classes) tended to be familiar with the law
of wills and deeds and had a personal lawyer on call whenever a change was needed. The
images that these cases and the activities of their actors evoke are clearly of a different
age than today where countless visits to the local estate planner would tend to drive up
expenses in excess of what these cash-poor but land-rich clients seemed able to manage.
Themes of Future Value
While the use of these informal "retirement contracts" has greatly diminished, eq-
uitable claims to the property of a deceased on grounds of a promised inheritance are
very much with us today. Often such claims involve long-term cohabitants whose rela-
tionships are not recognized by the state. The dependent cohabitant today has replaced
the child or other younger generation promisee, although often the cohabitant may in fact
be a member of a younger generation.
Only a handful of states continue to recognize common law marriage, a doctrine
that would give a long-term cohabitant a spousal share upon intestacy or a forced share if
not mentioned in the will. Ever since the Marvin v. Marvin4 3 decision in 1976, cohabit-
ants across the country have tried to enforce their equitable rights to property owned by
the other cohabitant.44 These claims have been particularly important for same-sex co-
habitants who, until recently, were not able to form legal relationships that would give
them spousal rights.
Too often, when a cohabitant is making an equitable claim to property under
Marvin, the court will apply the rule from these earlier cases, presuming that any ser-
40. Yet in Davison v. Davison, the first case to adopt a clear rule of specific performance, the claimant won
even though the promisor claimed a breach of the promise on grounds of the actions of the claimant's spouse.
Davison v. Davison, 13 N.J. Eq. 246, 248, 253 (N.J. Ch. 1861).
41. See e.g., Grandin v. Reading, 10 N.J. Eq. 370, 371 (N.J. Ch. 1855) (a mother executed a will in favor of
her daughter while living with her, and then moved to her son's house and shortly thereafter changed the will in
favor of her son).
42. See e.g., Vreeland v. Vreeland, 53 N.J. Eq. 387, 32 A. 3, 4 (N.J. Ch. 1895) (involving numerous deeds
that appear never to have been delivered, which would have fulfilled the promise during lifetime).
43. Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 122 (Cal. 1976) (holding that contracts between unmarried cohabitants
for domestic services are enforceable and not against public policy).
44. See e.g., Byrne v. Laura, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 908, 914, 916 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997) (holding support agree-
ments and property agreements between cohabitants enforceable).
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vices provided were gratuitous and not consideration that would entitle the claimant to a
share of the deceased partner's estate. Understanding the genesis of that rule is useful for
modern-day claimants who stand more closely to the position of spouses than that of
children, nieces, or housekeepers. Yes, even spouses may be presumed to have provided
their labor and caretaking services gratuitously. However, it is very hard, except in the
state of Georgia,4 5 to disinherit a spouse. Caretaking and related services performed by a
long time cohabitant who is standing in the shoes of a spouse deserve a different sort of
analysis. 46 If there is an understanding that continued support will be forthcoming and
the promisor dies before fulfilling that promise, there ought to be a viable claim against
the estate, just as there was for caretakers of elderly property-owners in New Jersey in
the 1860 to 1950 era. Given the enactment of statutes based on Uniform Probate Code
Section 2-514, however, it may be that the remedy in such cases is limited to quantum
meruit rather than specific performance. In any event, the cases from New Jersey, alt-
hough from a different time and a different sort of family relationship, do tell us some-
thing about how to construct a story that will help claimants to win in such cases.
CONCLUSION
Hendrik Hartog's book is a brilliant example of legal and social history. It is also a
work that reminds us of great literature. When I finished it, I felt like I was emerging into
the present from a Henry James novel. The great family dramas of literature are at the
core of this study of inheritance and care for the elderly and Hartog describes these dra-
mas beautifully. Times have changed and, on the surface, the use of property and inher-
itance to sway the young may look very different today, but the dramatic stories that un-
derlie cases involving family disputes over inheritance are not that much changed.
Reading Hartog's Someday All This Will Be Yours enriches one's knowledge and under-
standing of these age-old sagas in ways that help us to understand the complexity of sim-
ilar modern-day disputes.
45. Georgia does not have an elective share provision in its probate code to protect the disinherited spouse,
but it does have a year's allowance for support that is often generously awarded in such cases. Kristi L. Barbre,
Comment, Death and Disinheritance in Georgia: Reconciling Year's Support and the Elective Share, 4 J.
MARSHALL L.J. 139, 14041 (2011).
46. The state of Washington has agreed with this principle by enforcing quasi-community property rights
upon the death of a partner who has been in a meretricious or long-time committed relationship with another
person, whether that person is of the same-sex or opposite sex. See e.g., Vasquez v. Hawthorne, 33 P.3d 735,
737-38 (Wash. 2001).
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